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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AS A LIMITATION ON UNION CONTROL
OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES
ANDREW H. LEVY t
Labor unions play an important role in protecting the individual
employee from the often formidable power of management. In both
the negotiation and implementation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the power of organizations representing the interests of many
employees counterbalances the once overwhelming power of the em-
ployer.' Because unions represent a variety of employees with diverse
interests, however, some employees are inevitably dissatisfied with the
negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement or with the union's
disposition of grievances under the agreement. Yet some commentators
have argued that the vitality of the collective bargaining process de-
pends upon the union's absolute control over the procedures for
vindicating employee grievances.' The grievance procedures, they feel,
are an integral part of the collective bargaining agreement and can
function properly only if employees can be denied access to them by
employer-union agreement.
This Article argues the contrary: that within the present legal
framework for the administration of collective bargaining, greater pro-
tection of individual employees may be assured by diminishing union
control over the employees' access to the grievance machinery without
destroying the vitality of the collective bargaining process. It will
attempt to answer this question: What recourse should an employee
have when the union either refuses to press his claim or reaches an
agreement with management not to his satisfaction? An expansion
of the duty of fair representation through reliance upon the contractual
provisions would enhance the value of the collective bargaining relation-
ship as a mechanism for balancing the legitimate interests of employer,
union, and employee.
The Article will focus on contractual grievances pursued under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),3 rather
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than on employee complaints over the negotiation of the labor contract.4
In both situations, the same legal label-the duty of fair representa-
tion--describes the substantive protection afforded employees against
improper union action. But the context in which that duty is exercised
differs.5
The duty of fair representation is a judicially developed doctrine
designed to protect individual employees from a union's bad faith
conduct. Because an employee must show union bad faith before a
court will consider the merits of his claim, relief is difficult to secure.
Although the duty of fair representation should continue to determine
when an individual employee can process his own grievance or sue
in court, the content of the duty should derive from the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement itself, not from the union's inten-
tions. The substantive provisions of the agreement can provide an
objective limit to the union's discretion in settling or dropping griev-
ances and can act as a limitation on the employer's ability to rely upon
the union's good faith conduct as a defense. Expanding the duty of
fair representation would not afford an employee as much protection as
he would obtain from an absolute right to process his own grievance,
but it would give him greater assurance than presently exists that the
expectations generated by written agreement will not be nullified at will.
I. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND THE
EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO SUE
A. The Contract as a Source of Rights and Limitations
The Supreme Court ruled in Sniith v. Evening News Association6
that under section 301 of the LMRA an individual employee has stand-
ing to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Section 301
grants federal district courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 7 By
4 The failure to maintain this distinction allows Justice Goldberg in Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), to take the extreme position that the employer and
union can always alter or extinguish the viability of claims under the collective bar-
gaining agreement and thereby render the contract language irrelevant to a deter-
mination whether a violation of the duty of fair representation has occurred. Id. at
353-54. See generally id. at 359 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
5 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) itself suggests that the employee's
position in grievances differs from his position in negotiations. At least in the absence
of any exclusivity clause, §9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), grants an employee
the right to "present" grievances to his employer; but the same employee may not
bargain with the employer with regard to the negotiation of the contract. Most
union constitutions also distinguish the negotiation from the grievance process and
establish separate bodies with distinct powers to perform each task.
0371 U.S. 195 (1962).
729 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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construing "between" to modify "contracts" rather than "suits," the
Court enabled employees to bring suit in federal court under section
301.8 It rejected respondent's argument that suits by employees for
breach of a collective bargaining contract should be governed by state
law, and found that neither the language, the purpose, nor the history
of section 301 precludes such suits.'
But an employee's standing to sue does not guarantee adjudication
of the merits of his claim. The collective bargaining agreement creat-
ing the rights he seeks to vindicate under section 301 may limit,
modify, or control the enforcement of those rights, subject to the
duty of fair representation, by providing for exclusive grievance pro-
cedures.1" Such control over an employee's ability to vindicate his
rights has been the subject of considerable academic debate.
Writing in 1962, Professor Summers took the following posi-
tion: "' An employee has an absolute right under section 9(a) 12 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to process his substantive
grievances; the union and employer cannot vest in themselves exclusive
control of the remedial procedures in derogation of this right. Al-
though the legislative history is unclear, section 9(a) gives the
employee a "right" to veto an undesirable disposition of his grievance
prior to arbitration.'3 In deference to the national policy supporting
arbitration, the employee should be permitted to compel arbitration
of his claim (the costs to be allocated among union, employer, and
employee), but not freely enter the courts at this stage.'4
8371 U.S. at 200-01. The Court carefully avoided deciding which kinds of
substantive contractual claims an employee can bring; rather, it held only that the
employee has standing to sue in a state court. See id. at 201 n.9. In his dissent,
Justice Black criticized the Court for its failure to decide whether an employee could
sue under the particular contractual clause in question. Id. at 204 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
9 Id. at 200-01. The Smith decision was facilitated by the Court's decision five
years earlier in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957),
in which it held that § 301 establishes a foundation for a substantive federal law
of collective bargaining.
10 Because the collective bargaining agreement scrutinized in Smith contained
no grievance arbitration procedure granting the union control over grievances, it
imposed no contractual limit upon an employee's ability to vindicate his claim. See
371 U.S. at 196 n.1.
11 Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
1229 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). The statute provides that the majority union
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, that any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect . . ..
13 Summers 376-85.
14 Id. 400-04.
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Six years earlier, Professor Cox took a different stance: 15 Too
strict a reading of the word "right" disregards the remaining language
of section 9(a). The section 9(a) proviso means only that the em-
ployer does not commit an unfair labor practice by receiving grievances
from employees.1" The union and company are still free to agree, as a
matter of contract, to grievance procedures granting the union exclusive
power to process grievances. 7 The ability to contract in this manner
is important primarily because contractual language is often purpose-
fully ambiguous: all eventualities cannot be foreseen and the process of
specification in the contract is tedious and inflexible. The union and
employer contemplate the need to bargain continuously about their
agreement. To assert that a neutral third party can always discern a
"correct" contractual interpretation places too much reliance on a docu-
ment intended to provide only guidelines.'"
Cox further argued that: disputes of importance to all members
of the bargaining unit should not be placed in the hands of individual
employees; interpretation by mutual consent of the union and employer
will promote greater acceptance among employees than will an inter-
pretation imposed by an outside party; consistency of application will
be more likely if the union controls the grievance process; the ability
of individual employees to press grievances freely will undermine the
union's position as collective bargaining representative and exacerbate
internal political divisions, if any, of the union; and frivolous claims
and the costs they generate will be minimized by union control of
grievance procedures.'9
Professor Summers sought to avoid or alleviate these problems by
a procedure best described as "arbitrational overkill." By allowing an
employee to force any claim to arbitration, he vowed to insure em-
ployee rights. To maintain the viability of the contract, he sought to
preserve consistency of interpretation by requiring the arbitrator to
weigh heavily an interpretation of the contract agreed upon by the
employer and union.2" Aside from the difficulties of devising standards
to determine how much weight should be given to such an inter-
pretation, the major infirmity of this procedure is that it would
diminish both the union's incentive to represent fully employee claims
and the union's and employer's incentive to settle claims. To rely on
15 Cox.
16 Id. 624.
17Id.
18 See id. 625-27.
19 Id.
20 Summers 404.
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the Steelworkers Trilogy " as a basis for encouraging individual access
to arbitration mistakenly focuses on arbitration as an end in itself and
not merely as the final stage of a series of procedures designed by
employer and union to be used by them to promote industrial peace
and proper administration of the collective bargaining agreement."
Arbitration is only a last resort.
While the academic struggle continued,' the courts sided with
Professor Cox. Individual employees were not only precluded from
side-stepping the union-controlled grievance procedures provided for
in the contract, but were also incapable of either forcing the union to
process them within the contract or processing them themselves within
the machinery.' In Black Clawson Co. v. International Association
of Machinists,-' the employer sought a declaratory judgment under
section 301 that an employee grievance of wrongful discharge was not
arbitrable under the contract. The Second Circuit affirmed a district
court decision that the employee could not individually process the
grievance or compel the employer to arbitration. 6 The court con-
cluded that in view of a contractual provision establishing a particular
method of processing grievances under union control, chaos in the
administration of contracts would be avoided only by adhering to the
method agreed upon by the union and employer as the means of settling
their differences. The case contained no allegation that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation.
Not until Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox 7 did the Supreme
Court interpret section 9(a). Maddox sued his employer for severance
pay under a contract providing for such pay if the employee was laid
off because the mine in which he worked closed permanently.2 8 Al-
though the contract provided for a three-step grievance procedure
followed by binding arbitration, Maddox did not attempt to use this
21 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2 2 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
23 E.g., Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIc~. L. REv. 1435
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Three Phases of Unionismn] ; Blumrosen,
Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority verms
Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTarGs L. REv. 631 (1959); Hanslowe, The Collective
Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L. J. 1052 (1963); Ratner,
Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260 (1964).24 Bift see Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1945), in
which the Fifth Circuit indicated that, although confined to the machinery provided
for in the contract, the employee would be able to use it himself to process his
grievance.
25 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
26 Id. at 186.
27 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
2 8
1d. at 651.
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procedure, but sued for breach of contract in state court almost three
years after his layoff.
The Court indicated that whether an employee can bring suit
under the substantive provisions of the contract depends upon an
interpretation of its remedial provisions. As a standard for inter-
preting these provisions, the Court, in effect, established a presumption
that the contractually created grievance procedures are exclusive. Only
when the contract expressly provides that these procedures are not
exclusive can the employee sue under federal contract law.2" Absent
such a provision, the union must be afforded an opportunity to act on
the employee's behalf."°
The Court apparently regarded as conclusive the rationale of the
arbitration cases 31 and the express congressional approval of agreed-
upon grievance machinery as the preferred method for settling disputes
and stabilizing the "'common law' of the plant." 32 To promote
consistency of interpretation, union participation in the processing of
grievances, union prestige, and employee convenience, the Court relied
on section 203(d) " as a basis for giving full play to the provisions
of the employer-union agreement.
Justice Black dissented, however, on the grounds that such re-
liance is completely misplaced in an employee's suit under the contract,
not only because the arbitration decisions used as precedent were
concerned only with the employer-union relationship, but also because
an employee claim is inherently prejudiced if always subject to the
control of the parties alleged to be acting contrary to his interests. 4
Moreover, he suggested that confining an employee to the contractual
procedure may be unconstitutional,3" because a mere contract between
employee and union should not deprive courts of jurisdiction in an
area in which they have traditionally offered protection to individuals
bringing contractual claims. Arbitration lacks many of the procedural
safeguards provided in judicial adjudication.
Despite Justice Black's fears, the Court seemed content with the
broad sweep of its language and with its reliance on the procedures
291d. at 657-58.
30 Id. at 652-53, 657-59.
31United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
32379 U.S. at 653.
33Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) §203(d), 29 U.S.C. §173(d)
(1964):
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
4 379 U.S. at 667-69 (Black, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 663.
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established by the agreement. Yet the Court's italicization of the word
"attempt" in its statement of the general rule " left open the question
of fair representation with respect to the union's performance in
processing grievances. By citing Humphrey v. Moore 37 and NLRB
v. Miranda Fuel Co.,38 the Court indicated that exceptions to its broad
statement of deferral to the contractual procedures might develop if
the duty of fair representation was breached. Furthermore, by ex-
amining (although rejecting) a claim that access to these particular
procedures was unavailable, the Court implied that the employee need
not attempt to comply with such procedures if access is indeed un-
available. 9 Under these circumstances evidencing no infirmities in the
procedures and no improper union conduct, giving full play to con-
tractual language seems quite reasonable. The Court thus turned
towards the views of Professor Cox.4"
B. Examining the Contract
If the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement determine
the employee's ability to control the processing of his grievance, absent
a violation of the duty of fair representation, an effort to protect the
rights of employees should begin with an inquiry into whether the
contract gives the union exclusive control over the processing of all
grievances. That is, is the dispute in question covered by the contract,
and does the contract grant the union exclusive control over the
grievance machinery?
1. Whether a Dispute Is Covered by the
Grievance-Arbitration Procedure
When the grievance procedure does not cover, or specifically ex-
cludes, a contractual claim by an employee, the employee has standing
36
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor
policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract griev-
ances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
employer and union as the mode of redress.
Id. at 652 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
37 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (discussed at text accompanying notes 109-12 infra).
38 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (discussed at text accompany notes 78-82
infra).
39 379 U.S. at 659.
40 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-87 (1967), the Court described the cir-
cumstances in which the employee may avoid the union's contractual right of
absolute control of the grievance procedures. Unless the employee can show both
a breach of contract by the employer and a violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion by the union, the employee must accept the union's resolution of his grievance.
The issue raised by § 9(a) was never specifically discussed in the Vaca opinion.
Presumably, the Court felt that the issue was settled by its citation to Maddox, and
that it was only dealing with the exceptions to the rule, foreshadowed by that case.
For further discussion of Vaca, see text accompanying notes 94-100 infra.
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to sue under Smith. But when an employee with a grievance not
specifically excluded alleges in court that the dispute is not covered by
the grievance-arbitration procedure, the court must adopt a standard
for determining the scope of the procedure. If the employee has ignored
the grievance procedures of the contract and has come directly to
court, the court should defer to the breadth of the contract and dismiss
the suit.
In the Steelworkers Trilogy,4" the Supreme Court held that an
order to compel arbitration would issue unless the collective bargaining
agreement expressly excluded the particular question from the arbitra-
tion procedure.42 If the employee does not attempt to resolve his
grievance through the procedures established by the contract, courts
should employ a similar standard when confronted with an employee's
suit alleging that his grievance is not within the grievance-arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement. Such a standard allow-
ing the employee to proceed in court only when the arbitration clause
expressly denies coverage of his grievance would at least permit an
attempt to resolve the grievance through the contractual procedures.
After his suit is dismissed, the employee may seek to have the union
process his grievance. If the union presses his grievance fully, it will
be resolved at one of the steps of the grievance procedure or taken to
arbitration. If the arbitrator rules in favor of the employee on the
merits, the employee achieves his goal; if against him, the employee
can seek judicial review. A decision by the arbitrator that he lacks
jurisdiction gives the employee a determination which should enable
4lUnited Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For further com-
mentary on these cases, see Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October
Term 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. RFv. 901, 919-35 (1960); Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CRI. L. RFv. 464 (1961); Smith &
Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute: Arbitration, The Emerging Federal
Law, 63 MicH. L. Rxv. 751 (1965); Symposium: Arbitration and the Courts, 58
Nw. U.L. R-v. 466, 494-521, 532-44 (1963).
42 The typical arbitration clause is written in words which cover, without
limitation, all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a
collective bargaining agreement. Its words do not restrict its scope to
meritorious disputes or two-sided disputes, still less are they limited to dis-
putes which a judge will consider two-sided. Frivolous cases are often
taken, and are expected to be taken, to arbitration. What one man considers
frivolous another may find meritorious, and it is common knowledge in
industrial relations circles that grievance arbitration often serves as a safety
valve for troublesome complaints. Under these circumstances it seems proper
to read the typical arbitration clause as a promise to arbitrate every claim,
meritorious or frivolous, which the complainant bases upon the contract.
The objection that equity will not order a party to do a useless act is out-
weighed by the cathartic value of arbitrating even a frivolous grievance
and by the dangers of excessive judicial intervention.
Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKy MT. L. REv.
247, 261 (1958), cited in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
568 n.6 (1960).
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him to vindicate his claim in court. Finally, union refusal to process
the grievance fully would enable the employee to bring suit claiming a
breach of the duty of fair representation.
Such a standard would also prevent questions which the Steel-
workers Trilogy sought to confine to the arbitration procedure from
being thrown into the courts merely because they were pressed by an
employee rather than a union. Employer faith in the grievance-
arbitration procedure would be reinforced in fulfillment of the con-
gressional policy expressed in section 203 (d) of the LMRA.
A more difficult question arises when an employee sues on the
contract, claiming the grievance is not covered by the contractually
created grievance procedure, after a settlement has been reached by the
union and the employer. Many of the reasons for deference to the
breadth of the contract when the employee has made no attempt to
utilize the grievance procedures of the contract are inappropriate when
the employee has made an attempt. In Rothlein v. Armour & Co.,'
the Third Circuit clearly indicated that in such cases the courts are
to decide the issue of coverage on the merits. Employees sought an
accounting and payment of amounts in a pension fund established by
an old collective bargaining agreement. The action was brought prior
to any attempt to utilize the grievance procedure. The district court
granted a stay of all proceedings until such an attempt was made.
After the claim was taken through the three steps established by the
collective bargaining agreement, the district court granted Armour's
motion for summary judgment and held that a "final" determination
binding on the courts had been reached. The Third Circuit remanded
the case to the district court for a finding whether the accounting
for pension funds was the type of dispute contemplated to fall within
the grievance procedures of the contract. 4
Despite the Rothlein case, only limited protection is offered to an
employee claiming that his grievance is not covered by the procedures
established in the contract. Coverage is usually undisputed. In the
traditional categories of grievances-seniority, discipline, pay-cover-
age will be virtually conceded. Even when coverage is uncertain, courts
outside the Third Circuit will not necessarily concur with Rothlein.
2. Avoiding the Exclusivity of "Exclusive" Procedures
Once a court determines that as a matter of contractual inter-
pretation the grievance-arbitration procedures over which the union has
exclusive control cover the particular grievance, those procedures must
43 391 F2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968).
44 Id. at 579-80.
UNION CONTROL OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES
be followed in processing a grievance. An employee may retain some
rights after unsuccessfully resorting to these procedures, but failure to
use them will generally provide a complete defense to an employee's
suit on the contract. The Court in Maddox required that an employee
at least attempt to use the established procedures and give the union an
opportunity to act on his behalf when the claim is within the contract.'
A contrary rule allowing the employee to vindicate substantive
claims without being bound by contractual provisions qualifying his
ability to vindicate them would undercut both the union's prestige and
its ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for the orderly
settlement of grievances.48 Moreover, the inclusion of certain language
in the collective bargaining agreement is often conditioned on the
understanding that such language will be effectuated by the procedures
prescribed in the agreement.4 Encouraging settlement of grievances
within the collective bargaining context in preference to court inter-
vention by requiring "compliance with" or "exhaustion of" the pro-
cedures provided for in the contract is also a sound analogue to the
doctrine of "exhaustion" in administrative law.4
But some courts have found "exhaustion" of the contractual pro-
cedures unnecessary even when an employee has completely side-stepped
the procedures without approaching the union. 9 Union hostility, a
conspiracy between the employer and the union," or proof of the
futility of resorting to the procedures "' nullifies an employer's defense
based on failure to comply with the contractual procedures. Effective
access to the grievance procedures must be available for their mere
existence to preclude private suit.," Bare allegations of union hostility
are insufficient to allow complete avoidance of the grievance-arbitration
procedures,5 but an employee is permitted to initiate his own suit when
the evidence reveals an inherent conflict of interest between the union
and the employee.' Similarly, when either party repudiates the griev-
4 5 Note 36 supra.
46 379 U.S. at 653.
47 See Cox 606.
4 8 See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIxISTRATIVE AcTIoN 424-58 (1965).
49 Some of these cases were decided prior to Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967),
which confines employees to the remedies established by the collective bargaining
agreement unless the union breaches its duty of fair representation. But Vaca
probably does not invalidate many of the prior cases based on an "exhaustion"
rationale, because the same activity making exhaustion unnecessary would now be
deemed a violation of the duty of fair representation.
50 Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964).
51 Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1967).
52 Richardson v. Communication Workers Local 7495, 267 F. Supp. 403 (D. Neb.
1967).
63 Wade v. Southern Pac. Co., 243 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
54 Chapman v. Southeast Region ILGWU Health & Welfare Recreation Fund,
280 F. Supp. 766 (D.S.C. 1968). The conflict of interest referred to here should
be distinguished from that raised by the plaintiffs in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
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ance procedures or when the breach effectively rescinds the entire con-
tract (including any grievance procedure)," employees may be per-
mitted to disregard the procedures.
An employee's unsuccessful attempt to use the grievance machinery
facilitates proof of its unavailability. But a formal attempt may be
unnecessary." In a suit alleging racial discrimination by the union
and inadequate grievance procedures, the Supreme Court discussed the
attempt requirement of Maddox:
Here the complaint alleges in the clearest possible terms that
a formal effort to pursue contractual or administrative rem-
edies would be absolutely futile. Under these circumstances,
the attempt to exhaust contractual remedies, required under
Maddox, is easily satisfied by petitioners' repeated complaints
to company and union officials, and no time-consuming
formalities should be demanded of them. 7
If the employee cannot demonstrate the unavailability of the con-
tractual procedures, the rule requiring him to attempt to use them is
rigorously enforced."' Regardless of the nature of the grievance, he
335 (1964). In Chapman, the conflict of interest arose because the union could
support the employees' claims in arbitration only by arguing the illegality of a
provision it had inserted into the contract in violation of the South Carolina right-
to-work law. The union had to choose between the mutually inconsistent alternatives
of supporting its own interests or those of certain employees. But in Humphrey,
the union was engaging in the traditional union function of balancing the interests
of two groups within the union when it dovetailed two seniority lists and thereby
caused some employees to lose seniority. Nothing in the relationships and contractual
provisions predetermined the decision or impaired the union's ability to make a
rational choice. Of course, once the decision was made, the union obviously had an
interest in upholding its validity; but that interest does not vitiate the integrity of
its decision between the two competing groups of employees. See 280 F. Supp. at
770-71.
55 Cf. Drake Bakeries Inc. v. American Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1962). In Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Inc., 243 F. Supp.
755 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
957 (1967), the district court dismissed the amended second complaint, in which
the suing employees sought specific performance of the grievance procedures, because
the initial complaint as well as the intervening activities of the employer, the union,
and the employees demonstrated a repudiation of these procedures.
56 See Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1967).
But see Brown v. Truck Drivers Local 355, 264 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1967).
57 Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 331 (1969).
68 The wording of the employee's allegations is also subject to judicial scrutiny.
At least one district court has held that merely alleging attempts to enforce rights
under the collective bargaining agreement is insufficient; rather, an employee must
allege an attempt to use the grievance procedures. See Brown v. Truck Drivers
Local 355, 264 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1967), in which an attempt to distinguish
Maddox on the grounds that there the employee could initiate the procedure him-
self was also rejected by the court. But some cases evidence greater flexibility. In
Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit
excused a failure to file a timely grievance, which precluded any use of the
grievance procedure, because the parties' common misconception of their con-
tractual obligations prevented the employee from attempting to have the union process
his claim. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruc-
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must afford the union an opportunity to act on his behalf in a claim
under the contract. Unrestrained by this requirement of initial resort
to the contractual procedures, 9 individual employees could undermine
industrial self-government and the continuity of collective bargaining
by bringing employers into court at will.60
But under what circumstances may the employee obtain judicial
relief after the union has secured a settlement or resolution unacceptable
to the aggrieved employee? The rigorous enforcement of the require-
ment that an attempt be made to use the contractual procedures does
not dispose of this question. The Court's general willingness to defer
to the contractual provisions 1 may not be determinative. The itali-
cization of the word "attempt" in Maddox supports the view that an
employee may seek judicial relief after exhausting his contractual rem-
edies. A judicially devised scheme envisioning nonfinal settlements
would still permit resolution of many grievances under the contractual
procedures; subsequent judicial examination of the issue would benefit
from findings made under the procedures; and the parties' initial re-
liance upon the contractual remedies would have a therapeutic effect.'2
But reading Maddox to permit broad judicial review of final
determinations " under the grievance procedure ignores the rationale
for the Court's requirement that an employee attempt to utilize con-
tractual remedies before bringing suit. The Court suggested that only
tions to stay the proceedings until the parties had the opportunity to utilize the
grievance procedure. The court stated:
In view of the strong policy favoring resort to contract grievance procedures
before the courts are presented with this type dispute, we feel that under the
facts the company has not wrongfully refused to process the grievance so as
to eliminate the requirement that the process be used.
Id. at 290.
69 The requirement of initial resort to the contractual procedures contemplates
that the employee will allow sufficient time for the procedures to operate. Although
he may avoid unduly protracted procedures, the employee does not satisfy the re-
quirement by filing suit only three weeks after invoking the final grievance pro-
cedure. See Stumo v. United Air Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968).
60 If the exclusive grievance procedures controlled by the union provide for
arbitration, the employer might conceivably prefer a judicial determination to
arbitration for a particular grievance. In that case, he might invite an employee
suit, ignore the employee's failure to exhaust or comply with the contractually agreed-
upon procedures, defend the action on the merits, and thereby embarrass the union
and diminish its prestige. Absent a breach of the duty of fair representation, how-
ever, the union faced with this conduct would be able to sue the employer for breach
of contract and to compel arbitration pursuant to its contractual control over proc-
essing grievances.
61 Text accompanying notes 24-33 mtpra.
' See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Although
requiring an attempt to exhaust contractual remedies through the union, the court
held that the employee could compel arbitration even when the union settled the
claim prior to arbitration. The employee was thus able to act within the confines
of the contractual procedures while ignoring the union's power to control them.
63The phrase "final determination" here includes a union's decision not to
process a grievance.
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union refusal to process, perfunctory processing, or breach of the duty
of fair representation in processing would overcome the policy favoring
union-employer settlement. Despite occasional cases interpreting Mad-
dox to allow an employee suit simply because the union refused to
process his claim to completion," most courts have concluded that under
Maddox a union's resolution of a grievance bars the employee from
subsequently bringing suit on the grievance,", absent a breach of the
duty of fair representation.
The most important cases 66 supporting this majority view arose
in the Sixth Circuit out of an incident in the cafeteria of the Union
News Company. Concerned about high costs and poor performance
at a lunch counter where the plaintiff-employee worked with a crew
of about one dozen persons, the company, with the union's concurrence,
instituted a temporary layoff of five employees for a test period. Dur-
ing the test period, performance at the lunch counter improved sig-
nificantly and the employees were consequently discharged with the
union's consent. Two of the discharged employees sued under a
provision permitting discharge only for "just cause," but each was
rebuffed in the Sixth Circuit on the ground that the collective bargain-
ing agreement, by allowing the union, pursuant to its statutory status
of exclusive representative, to determine with the employer the con-
tract's meaning, provided a conclusive, affirmative defense to an em-
ployee suit.
Dissenting to the denial of certiorari in Simmons v. Union News,6"
Justice Black pointed out the impropriety of allowing the employer and
the union, acting under the guise of "interpreting" the collective bar-
gaining agreement, to dispose of potentially valid employee claims. He
added that the employer was unable to present any evidence that one
of the discharged employees had done anything to lower profits, and
that another discharged employee had offered to prove that the office
girl who counted the money had subsequently been discharged for
embezzling lunch counter funds. Concluding that as a matter of law
the absence of personal guilt precludes discharge for "just cause,"
Justice Black argued that union-employer power to effect a final settle-
ment of an employee grievance should be limited.
64 See Simmons v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
65 See, e.g., Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F2d 414, 418
(5th Cir. 1966).
16 Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
884 (1965) (Warren, C.J. & Black, J., dissenting) ; Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315
F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963) ; Union News Co. v. Hildreth,
295 F2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
67382 U.S. 884 (1965).
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The Union News cases appear to bar individual employee suits
subsequent to a union-employer settlement. 8 But the recently ex-
panded duty of fair representation may diminish their force, because no
attempt was made in those cases to invalidate the union-employer
settlement by showing a violation of that duty.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AS A
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHEN AN EMPLOYEE MAY
PROCESS HIS OWN GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
To understand how the duty of fair representation acquired the
function of deciding in most situations when an employee can process
his grievance on his own, despite a provision in the collective bargain-
ing contract granting the union absolute control over the processing of
grievances, requires an examination of a series of judicial and adminis-
trative developments, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in
Vaca v. Sipes.69
The duty of fair representation originated as a substantive check 70
upon the union's negotiating power. Its first call to battle came in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,71 a particularly com-
pelling case because the unfairness was alleged to be based on racial
discrimination. A Negro employee brought suit against his employer
and the union to enjoin the enforcement of a contract, negotiated by
the employer and union, which allegedly discriminated against him
because of his race. Reversing the denial of an injunction, Chief
Justice Stone held that because the recipient of the Railway Labor
Act's 2 designation as bargaining representative has the responsibility
"to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those
ISIn Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966),
the court observed that Smith opened the door to employee claims under the con-
tract, but the Union News cases barred them. Almost every collective bargaining
agreement provides for binding final determination, whether by arbitration, by union-
employer agreement, or implicitly by union acquiescence in employer action. See
Comment, Section 301(a) and the Employee: An Illusory Remedy, 35 FORDHAM L.
REV. 517, 518-19 n.16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Section 301(a) and the
Employee].
109 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
7o The word "substantive" means that a violation of the duty is deemed to be
grounds for a suit against the union for relief, whether the relief sought be damages,
a negative injunction, or a mandatory injunction. Subsequent discussion referring
to the other role of the duty of fair representation, in which proof of its violation
provides the means of overcoming an employer defense based on the exclusive griev-
ance provisions of the contract, refers to the duty in its "exhaustion" role.
71323 U.S. 192 (1944).
7245 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969). For other cases
interpreting the duty under this Act, see Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S.
324 (1969) ; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
323 U.S. 210 (1944).
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for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them," 3 an
employer could not rely on or benefit from an agreement with the
union in which the union had violated this duty. In the courts, this
duty of fair representation as a substantive limitation on union conduct
grew to encompass other situations. The NLRA7 4 was read to
impose the same duty on its bargaining representatives; 75 unfairness
other than racial discrimination was viewed as violating the duty; 7
and the duty was applied to the union's processing of grievances as
well.
77
While the courts examined possible applications of the duty of fair
representation, the National Labor Relations Board finally sought to
assert its jurisdiction over conduct violating the duty. In Miranda
Fuel Co., 8 the Board held, inter alia, that the protection afforded to
employees by section 9(a) 's 79 imposition on the union of a duty of
fair representation was subsumed in the rights granted in section 7
of the NLRA8 0 to employees. Consequently, a violation of the duty
constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1) (A) of the
NLRA5 s in that it restrained and coerced employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by section 7 "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing." In finding a section 7 right to
fair representation, the Board concluded that unfair, irrelevant, or in-
vidious treatment by the exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting
employment was an unfair labor practice. Although the Board's order
was denied enforcement by the Second Circuit,82 a majority of the court
73 323 U.S. at 203.
7429 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
75 Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). Although the Court's per curiam opinion in Syres
only cited Steele and several other Railway Labor Act cases, without reference to
any particular provision of the NLRA, the duty is derived from § 9's conferral on
the union of the status of exclusive representative of the bargaining unit. See 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
76 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
7 7 See Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945).
78 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
A contractual provision allowed an employee to take a leave of absence during the
slack season from April 15 to October 15 without losing seniority. When an em-
ployee took such a leave on April 12 with the employer's permission, but did not
return until October 30 due to illness, the union initially claimed he had lost his
seniority. When the company insisted upon excusing the employee for his late
return, the union countered by claiming he had lost his seniority by leaving early.
The union's second claim was made only after a vote by the employee's fellow union
members that he should lose his seniority, and notwithstanding a prior judicial
interpretation of the contract holding that only a late return was sufficient grounds
for loss of seniority. This action by the union was the basis for the Board's holding
that the union had acted hostilely and in violation of its duty to act fairly and
impartially in its representative capacity.
7929 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
0Id. § 157.
81Id. § 158(b) (1) (A).
82 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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was unable to agree whether a breach of the duty of fair representation
is an unfair labor practice.
Notwithstanding the doubts raised by the Second Circuit's dis-
position, the Board continued to apply its doctrine. In Independent
Metal Workers Union [Hughes Tool Co.],8 the Board held that racial
discrimination in processing of grievances did violate section
8(b) (1) (A). In asserting jurisdiction on the basis of a breach of
the duty of fair representation, the Board acknowledged that it was
enforcing a duty originally created judicially under the Railway Labor
Act in Steele, but justified its action by pointing to the Court's lan-
guage in Steele and subsequent cases emphasizing the lack of adminis-
trative remedies under the Railway Labor Act as a reason for judicial
creativity. Once the Taft-Hartley Act created unfair labor practices
against unions, however, an administrative remedy became available.84
By the time Vaca reached the Court, two other cases 85 in which
the Board had found breaches of the duty of fair representation to be
unfair labor practices were before the Fifth Circuit. Both cases in-
volved racial discrimination as the basis for finding a violation of the
duty of fair representation and an unfair labor practice. Despite the
strength of these two cases and the Fifth Circuit's enforcement of the
orders in the context of racial discrimination, the breadth of the duty
of fair representation as the basis for an unfair labor practice in other
circumstances was uncertain. Although some of the language in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB 8" suggested that the merits of the employees' substantive
grievances might be relevant, the status and relevance of this factor
as well as others in making determinations of such unfair labor prac-
tices was not explored.
Whatever the status of a breach of the duty of fair representation
as an unfair labor practice, the possibility after Miranda Fuel that it
might constitute activity subject to sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA sug-
gested a new hurdle to overcome in a suit against the union when a
breach of the duty had been alleged: 87 preemption by the NLRB on the
83 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
84 Id. at 1575.
85Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced,
368 F2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 1367, Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368 F2d 1010
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
86368 F.2d 12, 17-18 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
8 Prior to Miranda Fuel, many actions involving breaches of the duty of fair
representation had been decided without even raising the possibility of preemption
by the NLRB. See, e.g., Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees,
309 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); Hardcastle v.
Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920
(1962). Even when the issue was raised, courts seemed to think that the Board's
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basis of its exclusive jurisdiction."8 At least when the substantive
allegation against the union is combined with a section 301 breach-of-
contract action against the employer, Justice White laid to rest any
doubts about this issue with a mere two sentences and a footnote in
Humphrey v. Moore. 9 Once a complaint against the employer alleges
a violation of the contract, the case will be fully adjudicated under
federal labor contract law," regardless of whether a violation of the
substantive duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice," be-
cause the contract action will be properly within the cognizance of the
federal or state court. 2  This result was facilitated by the Court's
previous decision " that under section 301-at least in the absence of
a contractual provision granting the union absolute control over the
grievance procedures-an individual employee could sue the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement even though the
alleged action by the employer constituted an unfair labor practice.
The preemption question posed in Vaca was the next step: would
preemption preclude judicial cognizance of the substantive duty of
fair representation when the action did not involve a section 301 con-
tract action against the employer as in Humphrey? The Court's nega-
tive response to the question refused to deal with it directly. Instead
it concentrated on an analysis of the duty's role in a third situation 94_
inaction precluded preemption. See, e.g., Berman v. National Maritime Union, 166
F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
88 See Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
89 375 U.S. 335. 344-45 n.6 (1964).
90 Id. at 343-44 (citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
102-04 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-67
(1957)).
91 For a discussion of the undesirability of preemption when an unfair labor
practice is part of a § 301 action, see Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1963).
92 375 U.S. at 344-45 n.6 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962)).
93 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
94 Justice White also discussed several other general points supporting flexibility
in avoiding the preemption doctrine. First, Congress itself created several excep-
tions to the doctrine's application: the LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964), expressly
allows anyone damaged by action in violation of the NLRA § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (1964), to collect damages in a federal court; the LMRA § 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1964), permits suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements
even though the suit is based on action arguably an unfair labor practice; and the
NLRA § 14, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1964), permits state agencies and courts to assert
jurisdiction over certain labor disputes where the NLRB refuses to exercise its
jurisdiction to the fullest extent. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967).
Second, control of activity of peripheral concern to the NLRA or of compelling con-
cern to local interests (libel, violence, wrongful expulsion from union membership,
mass picketing) had not been preempted. Id. at 180. Third, the NLRB's inability
to give complete relief by itself under certain circumstances, and the possible lack
of any remedy in cases in which the NLRB's general counsel, in his unreviewable
discretion, fails to issue a complaint, both militate against the NLRB's exclusive
jurisdiction. Id. at 182-83. Fourth, the duty of fair representation was developed
judicially in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and the Board
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its exhaustion role in employee suits against the employer under a
collective bargaining agreement-a role not specifically raised or
argued, but created by the Court. 5
[T]he wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action
against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the
failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee
can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty
of fair representation in its handling of the employee's
grievance."
Given the holding in Humphrey of nonpreemption in combination
section 301-duty of fair representation actions already mentioned, and
given its decision to resist preemption in garden variety section 301
employee suits against employers by placing the duty of fair repre-
sentation in an exhaustion role, the Court was unlikely, whether or
not violation of the duty is an unfair labor practice, to remit to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB the question whether employee
suits against unions alone for breach of the duty were preempted. Al-
though in Vaca the Court faced an action against the union alone,
unattached to a section 301 claim against the employer, it disposed
of the distinction with little discussion, suggesting that reliance on pre-
emption was unnecessary to secure consistency in the development of
the duty because courts would be dealing with the duty of fair repre-
sentation in section 301 cases anywayY1
In Vaca, the Court resolved a previously undecided issue in an
effort to bolster its nonpreemption argument in a questionable case."
Despite Justice Black's fears that the Court failed to advance employee
protection sufficiently, 9 the Court did little more than supply the label-
is unlikely to have greater expertise in the cases just described, especially in light
of the duty's recent development and the frequent presence of grievance issues.
386 U.S. at 181-82.
Justice Fortas' concurring opinion viewed the preemption question differently.
Arguing for preemption, he viewed the NLRB as the body to strike the balance
between the employee and his union. Id. at 198-203 (Fortas, J., concurring).
95 Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967
SUPREME CoURT REviWW 81, 85-88 [hereinafter cited as Lewis].
96 386 U.S. at 186 (footnote omitted).
97 Recognizing that § 301 claims are always a threat to uniformity in the ap-
plication of §§ 7 and 8, the Court might have held that substantive claims based on
the latter sections are preempted unless joined with a § 301 claim as in Humphrey.
Such a holding would have at least confined some development of unfair labor
practices law to the NLRB. By eliminating all possibilities of preemption, the
Court created a situation in which the duty of fair representation as the exhaustion
standard in the run-of-the-mill § 301 contract suit by the employee will be substan-
tially litigated in the courts. Thus, any vestiges of NLRB control of the develop-
ment of that law vanished.
98 For criticism of the Vaca decision, see Lewis; Note, Individual Control Over
Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
99 [T]oday's decision, requiring the individual employee to take on both the
employer and the union in every suit against the employer and to prove not
only that the employer breached its contract, but that the union acted arbi-
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exhaustion-to be used in section 301 suits against the employer when
the employee alleges failure to comply with the grievance procedures
because of the union's breach of the duty of fair representation. The
dearth of fair representation litigation both in the courts and before the
Board prior to Vaca suggests that its application, especially in its new
exhaustion role, is yet to be fully explored. Whether the Vaca-
Humphrey line of cases can be read to suggest a more liberal attitude
toward employee protection under the contract than might be initially
expected from their language or from the views of some pessimistic
commentators 10o now depends upon the flexibility of the doctrine of the
duty of fair representation.
III. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS IN DETERMINING
VIOLATIONS OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. Giving Content to the Duty of Fair Representation
The statutory duty of fair representation is only violated "when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." ' In making this deter-
mination, "[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statu-
tory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of
its discretion." .02
A union decision favoring one group of employees is not neces-
sarily arbitrary. A union must constantly balance the interests of
various groups of employees, and some choices inevitably benefit one
group and harm another.' A court will invoke the duty of fair repre-
sentation only when the facts are compelling. In Chasis v. Progress
Manufacturing Co.,"0 4 the employer discharged the plaintiffs-employees
for lacking the qualifications to work in an electrical fixtures plant.
The court found sufficient to invoke the duty an allegation that the
union maliciously conspired with the employer to cause the employees
to lose their jobs and, while discouraging the employees from filing
trarily, converts what would otherwise be a simple breach-of-contract action
into a three-ring donnybrook. . . . Today's decision, while giving the worker
an ephemeral right to sue his union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion, creates insurmountable obstacles to block his far more valuable right
to sue his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
386 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting).
'OOSee Comment, Section 301(a) and the Employee; Note, The Duty of Fair
Representation and Its Applicability When a Union Refuses to Process an In-
dividual's Grievance, 20 S.C.L. REV. 253 (1968) ; Note, supra note 98.
101 386 U.S. at 190.
102 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
103 Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a re-
curring fact.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
104 382 F2d 773 (3d Cir. 1967).
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unfair labor practice charges within the NLRA's six-month statute of
limitations, refused to process the grievance or file the charge with the
NLRB.05 Allegations of racial discrimination are also sufficient.' 00
But limiting the violations of the duty of fair representation to
union conduct evidencing a motivation such as maliciousness or racial
discrimination vests too much discretion in the union to disregard the
contractual provisions authorizing it to act. Subtle discriminations or
simple unfairness will be almost impossible to prove.0 7 To broaden
employee protection under the duty of fair representation, the sub-
stantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement should be
used to limit the union's discretion in settling grievances' 8 and the
employer's ability to rely on wrongful union conduct as a defense.
Humphrey is authority for the proposition that the substantive
provisions ' are relevant in determining the fairness of the union's
105 See also Richardson v. Communication Workers, 267 F. Supp. 403 (D. Neb.
1967).
'OG See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The union may also violate the duty of fair
representation by utilizing its control over the grievance machinery to enforce
union discipline. Such activity, and certain union complicity in employer-designed
discipline procedures, may even subject the action to the procedural requirement
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, §101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§411(a)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969). See also Blumrosen, Three Phases of Unionism,
supra note 23, at 1501-03; Rosenberg, Interpretive Problems of Title I of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 405, 424-27
(1963).
107 Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why a worker might believe
that his interest is not properly served by the union's handling of a grievance.
First, the worker and the union might merely have a bona fide disagreement
as to the interpretation of a provision of the collective agreement, or they
might otherwise disagree as to the merits of his grievance or claim. Second,
the worker might think he has reason to fear union favoritism. A worker
might believe that his interests are either being opposed or inadequately
represented because he belongs to a disfavored racial, ethnic, sex or age
class or that he is personally obnoxious to the union leaders or membership.
On the level of internal union politics, an individual may fear that union
power will be abused because he is not a member or because he belongs to the
political opposition or a different union. An individual might also fear that,
to his detriment, he simply does not have as much political influence within
the union as other individuals who are backing interests in opposition to his.
Third, workers might have reason to fear that bureaucratic inefficiency or
prejudice will result in "incomplete investigation of the facts, reliance on
untested evidence, or colored evaluation of witnesses [that] may lead the
union to reject grievances which more objective inquiry would prove meri-
torious." Finally, there might be reason to believe that over-zealous concern
for institutional interests of the union and the collective enterprise will
induce union officials to trade off unrelated grievances or make wholesale
settlements that relinquish some meritorious claim or even to accept resolu-
tions, that very much lack in personal justice, of some grievances.
Rosen, The Individual Worker it Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the
Problen, 24 MD. L. Ray. 223, 245-46 (1964) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Rosen]. For an illustration of manipulation of grievances, see R. JAMES & E. JAMES,
HOFFA AND THE T AMSTas 167-85 (1965).
108 See Lewis 112-13.
109 The Steelworkers Trilogy indicates how expansively the "substantive provi-
sions" of the collective bargaining agreement can be construed. Neither the con-
tractual language nor ordinary contract law is the only source of interpretation.
Though necessarily based on the "essence" of the contract, a sound interpretation
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representation. In that case, the Court examined the collective bar-
gaining agreement to determine whether a joint committee composed
of union and employer representatives exceeded its authority under the
agreement. The Court did not regard the issue as one of fair repre-
sentation, but its examination of the employer-union resolution rested
on the assumption that the relevant substantive provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement circumscribed the joint committee's power
to integrate two seniority lists and subjected its interpretation to court
review." ° In short, union agreement to a resolution beyond the limits
of the bargaining agreement does not bind the employees. Although
the Court found that the union and employer reasonably interpreted
the contractual provision, its decision does not diminish the significance
of its efforts to determine whether the resolution rested upon some
"rational basis" consistent with an equitable resolution of inevitably
conflicting interests." Moreover, the Court elsewhere affirmed its
power to define the scope of the power granted the union1"
2
B. Standards for Judicial Review of a Union's
Disposition of an Employee Grievance
A finding that an employee's grievance is meritorious satisfies only
the first of Vaca's two requirements. To support its intervention in
the grievance-arbitration procedures, a court must also find that the
union's disposition of the employee's grievance breached its duty of
fair representation." 3
also includes the "common law of the shop." See United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-82 (1960). Although this practice of
construing the substantive provisions broadly arose in the context of granting flexi-
bility to a mutually agreed-upon third party expert, interpreting the parties' own
decisions with less flexibility would produce the anomaly of imposing different
standards of contractual interpretation for different stages of the grievance-arbitration
process. But see 375 U.S. at 352-55 (Justice Goldberg, concurring in Humphrey,
rejected the analogy to the arbitration decisions on the ground that the employer
and union are always free to alter their agreement, whereas the arbitrator is limited
to its terms).
110 375 U.S. at 345.
I' See id. at 347.
3.1
2 1d. at 345-46 n.8.
113 Situations may arise in which the first requirement of Vaca-that the em-
ployee prove a breach of contract-should not be rigorously enforced if the courts
wish to maintain the remedial flexibility to send the case to arbitration on the merits.
If the court orders the case to arbitration only to secure the "best interpretation of
the contract" (Has the contract been breached?), it need not first find a breach
of contract. If a breach of the duty of fair representation is found because, for
example, the union's interpretation completely disregarded the contract, the court
might prefer an arbitrator to select among alternative contract interpretations. Since
the results of the resort to arbitration would probably be predictable once the court
itself selected its own interpretation of the contract, the court would undermine the
arbitrator's freedom by interpreting the contract itself. Although authorized under
the Steelworkers Trilogy to formulate an independent interpretation, the arbitrator
would be unlikely to deviate from the court's position. Consequently, the first re-
quirement should be modified in at least some cases so that the employee must
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The contrast between the majority and the dissent in Vaca high-
lights the conflicting considerations in fair representation questions.
The majority sought to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process
by restricting an employee's ability to compel arbitration of contractual
claims already settled by the union and employer," 4 although it prob-
ably did not intend to preclude all third party review of employee
claims."' Fearing that the Court's decision encouraged the union and
the employer to override an individual employee's expectations, how-
ever, Justice Black argued that the majority sacrificed employee rights
to institutional power. By denying the employee the absolute right
to invoke the check upon union abuse provided by arbitration, the
Court, he noted, also acted inconsistently with its recent preference
for arbitration.' 0
Whether the union has breached its duty of fair representation in
situations like Vaca depends on whether the union was correct in
settling the grievance before arbitration. To enable courts to resolve
this question adequately, two alternative standards are herein proposed
to provide the employee with third party review of the union's decision
that arbitration would be fruitless, yet insulate the arbitral process
from frivolous claims.
At a minimum, a court should look to the contract itself and
evaluate the union's disposition of an employee's grievance by a
standard at least as strict as that for reviewing the acceptability of an
arbitrator's award. An arbitrator's disposition of a question arising
under the contract is unacceptable when he exceeds his authority by
failing to draw upon the "essence" of the contract in making his de-
show only that the interpretation he advocates is acceptable and that the union
violated its duty of fair representation. When the employee wants the court, not
the arbitrator, to grant full relief and decide the issue of the interpretation of the
contract, he must, of course, prove a breach before the court. This modified rule
would also be appropriate when the employee approaches the union with a grievance
based on a meritorious interpretation of the contract, after satisfying the require-
ments of Maddox by initially resorting to the grievance procedures, and the union
fails to respond in any way, see Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F2d 864,
867 (2d Cir. 1967), or fails to investigate the situation and take action until coerced
by a pending suit, see Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 266 F. Supp. 651, 654
(N.D.W. Va. 1967). Again, if the court prefers to have the arbitrator actually
interpret the contract, the union's subsequent adoption of the employer's justification
of his action should not insulate the union or employee from an arbitrator's deci-
sion, as a violation of the duty of fair representation has already been found (by the
court) to have occurred. The duty of fair representation seeks to further union
representation of employee interests, not their disregard. Of course, the union might
long ago have adopted the employer's position as its own; but the union should be
careful to communicate this to the grieving employee.
114 386 U.S. at 190-92 (citing NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438
(1967) ; Ross, Distressed Grievance Procedures and Their Rehabilitation, LABOR
ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL AcADEMy OF ARBITRATORS 104 (1963)).
115 Contra, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 357 (1964) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
316 386 U.S. at 207 (Black, J., dissenting).
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cision.. 17 In disposing of an employee's grievance under the contract,
the union and employer should not be able to exceed this limit imposed
upon a neutral third party's discretion. The court would thus initially
decide if an arbitrator would be permitted under the contract to accept
the union's disposition of the employee's grievance. If he would not,
the union has violated its duty of fair representation.
Yet the narrow scope of the arbitration review standard pro-
posed above and its explicit rejection of any judicial review of the
merits of an arbitration ".. point to the need for a standard affording
employees even greater protection under the duty of fair representation.
Neither cost, inconsistency, nor protection of the arbitral process justi-
fies judicial deference, merely because preferred by the union, to a
settlement likely to be found unacceptable on its merits by an arbitrator,
even if he would be permitted to accept it without overreaching the
bounds of his authority. Justice Black's possible overstatement in
Vaca of the need for resort to arbitration does not vitiate the implica-
tion of his argument: standards similar to those used in arbitration
itself should govern judicial intervention in the arbitral process. A
standard permitting a court to predict an arbitrator's probable evalua-
tion of the merits of competing contractual interpretations of the
grievance's validity would more effectively curb union abuse than the
arbitration review standard. This broader standard would not require
a court to make a de novo contractual interpretation, but would enable
it to reject not only interpretations judicially unenforceable as arbitra-
tion awards but also union positions it believes an arbitrator would not
accept. If the court determines that an arbitrator would favor the
union's interpretation, the arbitral process is spared the cost of the
grievance. But arbitration would be ordered if the employee's claim
appears not only meritorious but also able to win the arbitrator's favor.
Even if a court orders arbitration, however, its rejection of the union's
position would not bind the arbitrator. Because its preliminary ex-
amination is conducted under a broader standard than its review, a
court might uphold an arbitrator's acceptance of a union interpretation
it previously rejected.
In light of the Court's explicit refusal to review an arbitration
award's merits, this broader standard of review does not fit neatly
within the arbitration analogy. Courts have never employed such a
standard in arbitration cases, and they would also face the task of pre-
arbitration prediction without the expertise of arbitrators. But the
standard would afford an employee neutral third party review of his
claim.
.17 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
18 Id. at 596.
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The special expertise of arbitrators in the area of collective bar-
gaining does not preclude courts from preliminarily interpreting the
contract in this special instance. Judges frequently interpret contracts
without arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court's decision to submit
most of the jurisdictional and substantive questions first to the arbi-
trator and to enforce his awards with minimal review should not bar
the application of arbitral standards in other circumstances. The
suggested standard is particularly appropriate in duty of fair repre-
sentation cases. First, courts will probably find few union violations of
the duty of fair representation; thus, few cases will go to an arbitrator.
Second, an argument based on the fear that the employer-union griev-
ance-arbitration process may be undermined is not compelling when the
process itself is challenged as unfair.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED DUTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION
Expansion of the duty of fair representation in section 301 em-
ployee suits against employers through reliance upon the contractual
provisions should encourage aggrieved employees and stimulate union
responsiveness. But use of an expanded duty is questionable when the
substantive liability of the union or a violation of the duty as an unfair
labor practice is at issue.
In Vaca, the Court apparently used the duty of fair representation
as a single standard for defining both the union's substantive duty and
the limits of an employee's ability to overcome an employer's exhaustion
defense." 9 In his dissent in Vaca, however, Justice Black recognized
that the duty might define two different standards:
If the Court here were satisfied with merely holding that in
this situation the employee could not recover damages from
the union unless the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation, then it would be one thing to say that the union did
not do so in making a good-faith decision not to take the em-
ployee's grievance to arbitration. But if, as the Court goes
on to hold, the employee cannot sue his employer for breach
of contract unless his failure to exhaust contractual remedies
is due to the union's breach of its duty of fair representation,
then I am quite unwilling to say that the union's refusal to
exhaust such remedies-however nonarbitrary-does not
amount to a breach of its duty. 20
Because he viewed the section 301 action as more important, he was
willing to apply a narrower substantive standard to define a breach
119 See 386 U.S. at 191-92.
120 Id. at 207-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
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of the duty of fair representation in suits against unions so long as
the standard is relaxed when the duty plays an exhaustion role in
suits against employers. Yet if, as is recommended here, the duty as
it is used in section 301 suits is expanded by reference to provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement, the question arises whether ex-
pansion is necessary or desirable in suits against the union for breach
of its substantive duty.
The need for remedial flexibility calls for application of the same
standard-the broadened one recommended herein-in suits against the
union as well as in section 301 suits against the employer. To apply
a more lenient standard in a section 301 suit against the employer than
in a suit against the union alone would mean that the same circum-
stances justifying an action directly against the employer under section
301 might not justify an action against the union to compel it to
arbitrate a grievance. The entire grievance procedure, upon which the
court has been relying, would be undermined, because the employee
could sue the employer directly more easily than he could sue the union
to compel its proper functioning under the grievance procedures.
Assuming that it is desirable to allow courts to fashion relief within
the framework of the grievance-arbitration procedures provided in
the contract, then the standards must be the same.
Arguments supporting a narrow substantive standard are grounded
on fears that such suits will be a source of exacerbation of political
and personal disputes within the union, cause unnecessary expense to
the union, and fail to speak to the major concern: enforcement of the
employer's contractual obligations. But these arguments fade if the
remedy is confined either to compelling the union to operate within
the contractual procedures to pursue employee rights, allowing em-
ployees themselves to operate within the contractual grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures, or allowing the employees to bypass completely such
procedures as they seek remedies in court. All of these remedies are
directed to and result in enforcement of the substantive provisions of
the contract against the employer, and not in relief against the union.
But when the employee seeks damages against the union, as he
did in Vaca, either in a suit against the union alone or against both
employer and union, the threat to the union is more substantial and
direct. To award damages in this case to compensate the injured em-
ployee for a past event can foster proper union conduct only insofar as
the threat of such an award recalls the union to its vulnerability. The
award in any individual case does not help resolve the underlying
breach of contract claim precipitating the entire action. Indirect pres-
sure as a means of promoting enforcement of contract rights may be
misdirected. To threaten the union with damage actions when other
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remedies would be appropriate invites the use of such suits as a means
of engaging in union political struggles.
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the Vaca Court did
manage to provide unions some protection. It limited the prospects
of recovery against them by denying recovery for damages attributable
solely to the employer's breach of contract, and although it pointed out
that damages should be apportioned between the employer and union
according to the damages caused by the fault of each, it noted that in
most cases the employer's breach will be the only wrong for which
damages are appropriate.' 2 ' Thus, although it appears that the duty
of fair representation will be defined according to one standard in
suits against unions and against employers and unions, actions for
damages against unions will be severely limited.
The implications of an expanded duty of fair representation must
also be examined when considering a violation of the duty as an unfair
labor practice. That the Court has avoided two opportunities 122 to
deny that a violation of the duty of fair representation constitutes an
unfair labor practice cannot help but give impetus to those advocating
that the NLRB's position is correct. Assuming that violation of the
duty constitutes an unfair labor practice, vesting jurisdiction in the
Board, the question arises whether the scope of the duty as applied by
the Board need be expanded as recommended herein. If in fact it
chooses to expand the duty, it may well draw much business from the
courts (assuming that the courts refuse expansion), at least in actions
seeking relief against the union. And because the General Counsel
bears the expense of processing the action, aggrieved employees have
an added incentive to turn to the Board.
Yet the relief sought in most actions under collective bargaining
agreements will be against the employer and will entail interpretation
of contractual provisions. But the Board is unable to provide ap-
1 The Court noted that it was not dealing with a situation in which a union
affirmatively caused the employer to breach the contract. Alluding to the NLRB's
imposition of joint and several liability for back pay when combined union and
employer discrimination has injured an employee, the Court distinguished Vaca as
a case of a breach of contract with no union participation. Id. at 197 n.18. The
Court did not deal with the more difficult question posed by Humphrey: namely,
whether a union participates in a breach of contract when the breach of contract and
violation of the duty of fair representation arise from joint employer-union efforts
to "apply" the terms of the contract. If a violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion had been found in Humphrey and if the employees had sought damages, this
issue would have been posed. In light of the language employed by the Court, it
seems that mere cooperation by the union in the employer's breach of contract would
not justify joint and several liability; the Court suggests that to be liable in dam-
ages, the union must have "affirmatively caused the employer to commit the alleged
breach of contract." Id. (emphasis added).
'=Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964).
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propriate and complete relief in many such cases,2 3 and is generally
reluctant to immerse itself in the administration of collective bargaining
agreements or interfere with grievance-arbitration procedures. 2 4 Thus
its activity may be restricted to finding a violation of the duty of fair
representation only in those cases where union discrimination, hostility,
or arbitrariness can be proven without resort to the contractual pro-
visions, 2 5 or where the violation occurs during the negotiation of the
agreement. Furthermore, an aggrieved employee may turn to the
courts in hopes of securing a more sympathetic hearing from a jury
than he might otherwise from the Board.
Although the Board has indicated a willingness to more actively
enforce the duty of fair representation,1 26 the relationship between its
role and that of the courts remains unclear. If the judicially developed
duty of fair representation refuses the expanded definition recommended
here, pressure may be brought upon the Board to expand its reading
of the duty. If the Board responds favorably, the irony of Vaca will
be that the very case denying preemption by the Board of duty of fair
representation cases will have caused many grieving employees to resort
to the Board as the only viable source of protection.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has sought to develop a conceptual framework within
the current system of standards to strike a new balance among union,
employer, and employee without disturbing the legitimate values pro-
tected by the old. The Supreme Court encouraged, if not required,
those living in the world of industrial relations to focus on the col-
lective bargaining agreement to define their relationships therein. To
preserve the expectations generated thereby, the collective bargaining
agreement should not be abused with impunity.
123 See 386 U.S. at 187-88.
124 See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
125 See Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
126 Id.; Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 83 (1967); Cargo Handlers,
Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 321 (1966). But see Port Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 51 (1968).
